Senate Probe Alleges JPMorgan Flagged Only Millions While Epstein’s Billions Slipped By

In a dramatic new development, Senator Ron Wyden — ranking Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee — has released a detailed memorandum accusing JPMorgan Chase of longstanding failures in monitoring and reporting the financial transactions of Jeffrey Epstein and his network. According to the memo, the bank reported just $4.3 million in flagged transactions over a period of about fifteen years, while after Epstein’s 2019 arrest and death it retroactively reported roughly $1.3 billion in suspicious activity.  

What the memoran­d­um shows
The internal document, issued by Senate staff under Wyden’s direction, relies on unsealed court records from JPMorgan and other sources. Here are some of the key findings:

Between 2002 and 2016, JPMorgan filed just a handful of suspicious-activity reports (SARs) tied to Epstein’s accounts, flagging only about $4.3 million worth of transactions.

After Epstein’s arrest in 2019, the bank filed two large SARs covering more than 5,000 wire transfers, totaling approximately $1.282 billion.

The memo says Epstein was among JPMorgan’s “single largest clients” and was treated as part of the bank’s “Wall of Cash”.

Emails and internal documents show that senior executives — including those reporting to CEO Jamie Dimon — were in regular contact with Epstein, even after official termination of the banking relationship in 2013.

One startling claim: after the bank supposedly ended its client relationship with Epstein in 2013, it apparently continued to maintain the relationship indirectly because it valued Epstein as a source of referrals to other ultra-wealthy clients.

The bank’s compliance department internally raised alarm over Epstein’s large cash withdrawals and the involvement of his longtime accountant Harry Beller.

The stakes and significance
Why does this matter? According to Wyden’s memo, these failures are not mere mis-steps — they reflect “a compliance failure of this scale [that] is alarming” and “impeded law enforcement’s visibility into the financial infrastructure that enabled Epstein’s cross-border sex-trafficking organization.”

Put simply: while Epstein was alive and allegedly trafficking women and girls across borders, his bank flagged only a few million dollars of his transactions. Then, after arrest and death, they flagged hundreds of millions more. If half or even a portion of what Wyden claims is supported by evidence, then JPMorgan may not have been a passive observer — but an active enabler of a financial system built to obscure wrongdoing.

Responses and next steps
JPMorgan has responded by saying it “regrets” its prior relationship with Epstein and claims it complied with the law and reported when it became aware of the full extent of his misconduct. However, this raises the critical question: if the bank was indeed able to identify $1.3 billion worth of suspicious transfers in 2019, why was it unable (or unwilling) to do so when Epstein was actively using the system?

Senator Wyden is calling for a criminal investigation into JPMorgan’s role. The memo argues the bank’s conduct might violate the Bank Secrecy Act (which requires financial institutions to report suspicious activity) and demands the bank be held accountable

Moreover, the broader investigation is now examining not just Epstein — who died in custody in 2019 — but the institutions, individuals, and networks that allowed his operations to persist for years. One focal point is the role of his accountant Harry Beller, who made large cash withdrawals that were flagged—but apparently not acted upon robustly at the time.

Broader implications
This case underscores multiple structural issues:

The challenge of “follow the money” investigations, especially when powerful clients and large banks are involved.

The difficulty in monitoring ultra-wealthy individuals whose transactions may cross jurisdictions, use complex shell entities, and exploit gaps in compliance oversight.

The potential conflict of interest when financial firms value high-net-worth clients for referrals, even when those clients pose elevated risk.

The limits of regulatory compliance when not paired with active oversight, accountability, and enforcement.

What comes next?
Congress is now looking at subpoenas for JPMorgan and other banks involved. Wyden’s investigation is far from over. The memo outlines plans to seek full access to Treasury Department records related to Epstein, and to press for disclosure of all suspicious-activity reports tied to him and about 58 associated individuals and entities.

Law enforcement agencies likely will weigh whether the evidence warrants criminal referrals. Meanwhile, victims-advocacy groups, regulatory bodies, and central bankers will all be watching to see whether this becomes a pivotal moment in holding large institutions to account for their role in enabling illicit financial networks.

This investigation has the potential to reshape how large banks internalise risk and compliance when dealing with ultra-wealthy clients. It may also serve as a warning that financial institutions can no longer assume that status-quo deferment of suspicious transactions will go unchallenged.

If you like, I can dig up a timeline of Epstein-related banking disclosures, or a more detailed breakdown of the Memorandum’s findings (with page references) and provide a downloadable summary for you. Would you like me to do that?